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1172 Michigan Law Review 
Television Sponsor and Advertising Agency Held 
Vicariously Liable for Copyright 
Infringement-Davis v. E. I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co.* 
[Vol, 64 
DuPont sponsored a dramatization of Edith Wharton's novel 
Ethan Frome presented by the CBS television network. Petitioner 
claimed an infringement of his earlier copyrighted dramatization 
of the same novel and sought a declaration of liability1 against CBS, 
the producer of the program,2 DuPont, and its advertising agency, 
Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc. (BBDO). Although DuPont 
and BBDO were notified before the performance of the possibility 
of copyright infringement liability and could have stopped the pro-
ducers from using petitioner's play,3 they made no attempt to inter-
fere. In petitioner's action in the federal district court, DuPont 
and BBDO contended that they were not proper parties to any suit 
for infringement because they had not participated in the produc-
tion. The court found a "substantial and unfair use"4 of petitioner's 
production, and held that all defendants were liable for infringe-
• 240 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (hereinafter cited as principal case), 
1. The case was limited by stipulation of the plaintiff to issues of liability. The dis• 
trlct court sat without a jury and made separate findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in accordance with FED. R. C1v. P. 52. No judgment was entered. 
2. Talent Associates, Ltd., was the producer. Also joined as direct participants in 
the infringement were Talent Associates' officer in charge of the production and the 
Talent Associates employees who prepared the script. 
3. The court found that DuPont had the ultimate power to control the production 
and e.xercised that power through its agent, BBDO. Principal case at 631-32, 
4. Principal case at 620. This is the controlling test in the Second Circuit for 
infringement. See, e.g., Nutt v. National Institute Inc. for the Improvement of 
Memory, 31 F.2d 2!16 (2d Cir. 1929); accord, Comptone Co. v. Rayex Corp,, 251 F.2d 
487 (2d Cir. 1958); Alfred Bell &: Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 
1951). Other jurisdictions have adopted similar standards. See, e.g., Ansehl v. Puritan 
Pharmaceutical Co., 61 y.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932). 
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ment under the Federal Copyright Act.5 Although DuPont and 
BBDO had not participated in the production, they were neverthe-
less held vicariously .liable because they had a financial interest in 
an infringement by parties over whose programming they had the 
power of control.6 
The United States Congress, acting under authority granted by 
the Constitution, 7 has attempted to expand common-law rights in 
literary property in order to give protection to "every expression 
of human thought."8 Yet, although the present Copyright Act pro-
vides remedies for infringement, it does not indicate the elements 
of liability, stipulating only that "if any person shall infringe . . . 
the copyright laws of the United States," such person shall pay to 
the copyright proprietor both the profits he has made and the dam-
ages caused by the infringement.9 Consequently, the meaning read 
by the courts into the statutory language, "if any person shall in-
fringe," has largely established the basis for determining who will be 
held legally responsible under the act. The court in the principal 
case employed two different bases for liability. First, because the 
producers and C!3S had participated directly in the infringement, 
the court held them strictly liable, and did not require petitioners 
to show fault. Second, although DuPont and BBDO had n& partici-
pated in the infringement, they were nevertheless held vicariously 
· liable because of their power of control over the production and 
their financial interest in the infringing program. The following 
discussion will consider the applicability of these two bases of lia-
bility to copyright infringement10 and the policy of holding sponsors 
. liable for the content of television programs. 
5. 17 u.s.c. §§ 1-216 (1964). 
6. Principal case at 632. 
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
8. Greco, Copyright Protection and Radio Broadcasting, 3 LA. L. R.Ev. 200, 201 
(1940). See generally WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 174 (1917); 54 YALE LJ. 697 
(1945). 
9. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1964): "If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work 
protected under the copyright laws of the United States such person shall be liable 
••• to an injunction restraining such infringement [and] .•• to pay to the copyright 
proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the 
infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have made from such 
infringement •.. or in lieu of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the 
court shall appear to be just .••. " 
10. Courts have also imposed liability on parties who have induced others to in-
fringe, deeming them contributory infringers. See, e.g., Reeve Music Co. v. Crest 
Records, Inc., 285 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1960). This liability has generally been invoked 
when the inducer sold the infringing work to another person who subsequently made 
public use of it. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 
1947). Although this appears to be basically another form of participation, lack of 
intent that the work be put to an infringing use has been considered a valid defense. 
Harper & Bros. v. Kalem Co., 169 Fed. 61 (2d Cir. 1909), afj'd, 222 U.S. 55 (1911). 
It has been suggested that vicarious liability is merely a form of what should be 
a broader concept of contributory infringement and should be equated with the field 
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I. BASES OF COPYRIGHT LIABILITY 
A. Strict Liability 
[Vol. 64 
Courts have generally held that fault is not required for liability 
under section 101, the infringement provision, and that anyone who 
participates in an infringing work or performance is liable as an 
infringer.11 Consequently, the producer of an infringing radio pro-
gram has been held jointly and severally liable12 with the station 
broadcasting it,13 regardless of their mutual innocence or good 
faith.14 Although critics of this policy of strict liability have pointed 
to its harshness on innocent infringers,15 most courts have felt that 
strict liability is a desirable means of holding responsible the party 
with the ability to inquire into the nature of the infringing activity10 
and to insure against it.17 
The courts have justified liability without fault under the Copy-
right Act by drawing analogies with the substantive common law of 
of contributory patent infringement. However, since this theory has not been articu-
lated clearly and as yet has little if any support in precedent, it is not dealt with in 
this note. 
11. E.g., Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 Fed. 412 (2d Cir. 1916); Greenbie v. 
Noble, 151,.F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, 
Inc., 14 F.1iupp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). But see Barry v. Hughes, 103 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 604 (1939). 
12. Copyright infringement is a tort, and proof of the infringement leads to joint 
and several liability of all defendants. See Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., supra note 
11; Harris v. Miller, 50 U.S.P.Q. 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); HOWELL, COPYRIGHT LAW 179 
(rev. ed. Latman 1962); Note, Monetary Recovery for Copyright Infringement, 67 
HARv. L. REv. 1044, 1051-52 (1954). 
13. Select Theatres Corp. v. Ronzoni Macaroni Co., 59 U.S.P.Q. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). 
14. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein 8: Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 
1963); M. Witmark 8: Sons v. Tremont Social 8: Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787 
(D. Mass. 1960); R. R. Donnelley 8: Sons v. Haber, 43 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1942); 
Norm Co. v. John A. Brown Co., 26 F. Supp. 707 (W.D. Okla. 1939); M. Witmark &: 
Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412 (E.D. Tenn. 1927). 
15. See Barry v. Hughes, 103 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 604 (1939); 
Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 CoLUM L. REV. 503, 526•27 (1945); 
cf. De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J., dissenting), 
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1945); Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 171 N.E. 56 (1930). 
16. See Shapiro, Bernstein &: Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 1957), cert, 
denied, 355 U.S. 952 (1958); Khan v. Leo Feist, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 754, 755 (S.D.N,Y. 
1948). See also Letter From Melville B. Nimmer to the Copyright Office, June 16, 1958, 
in STUDIES PREPARED FOR SUBCOMMITI'EE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF 
THE SENATE COllIM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86m CONG., 2D SESs., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 
STUDIES Nos. 22-25, at 169 (Comm. Print 1960). 
17. "It is the innocent infringer who must suffer, since he, unlike the copyright 
owner •.• has .•. the ability to guard against the infringement (by an indemnity 
agreement •.• and/or by insurance)." Letter From Melville B. Nimmer, supra note 
16. See also Variety, Oct. 16, 1957, p. 63, col. 1 (reporting growth in demand for in• 
demnity agreements). But cf. 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 26.1, at 1362 n.l (1956) (in-
demnity is generally not pursued in master-servant application of vicarious liability). 
Several courts have also been influenced by the desire to burden enterprises with the 
losses caused by the risks they create. See Shapiro, Bernstein &: Co. v. H. L. Green Co,, 
316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963); De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 411-12 (2d Cir. 1944), 
cert. denied, 325 U.s: 862 (1945). 
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copyright infringement18 and conversion of property.19 Moreover, 
indications of congressional intent to impose strict liability may be 
found in the Copyright Act. Sections l(c)20 and I0I(b)21 of the act 
contain limitations on the liability of certain parties who show that 
they were not aware, and could not have reasonably known, of their 
infringement. Furthermore, section 21 protects an infringer's "rea-
sonable outlay innocently i:I?-curred" when the copyright notice has 
been inadvertently omitted from a particular copy of a work.22 Were 
innocent infringers already immune from liability, there presumably 
would be no need to give them this statutory protection. 
The legislative history of the Copyright Act also supports the 
inference that Congress intended to impose strict liability. Until 
the adoption of the present Copyright Act in 1909, the seller of an 
infringing work was not liable unless he knew that it was printed 
without consent,23 but innocence was not generally considered a 
defense to an action for infringement.24 There is evidence that those 
participating in the drafting and enactment of the 1909 act realized 
this situation.25 Nevertheless, the 1909 statute added no broad pro-
visions excusing innocent infringers; indeed, it eliminated the pro-
vision in earlier statutes expressly protecting the innocent seller. 
B. Vicarious Liability 
There appears to be nothing in the Copyright Act or in its 
legislative history to indicate a congressional policy favoring the 
imposition of vicarious liability. Because liability without fault for 
the copyright infringement of others had not yet been applied by 
the courts,26 vicarious liability was not a subject of debate in the 
18. Intent was not necessary for liability for common-law infringement of copy-
right. American Press Ass'n v. Daily Story Pub. Co., 120 Fed. 766 (7th Cir. 1902), 
appeal dismissed, 193 U.S. 675 (1904); Norris v. No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co., 271 Fed. 
536 (D. Md.), afj'd, 277 Fed. 951 (4th Cir. 1921). See generally 54 YALE L.J. 697 (1945). 
19. See American Press Ass'n v. Daily Story Pub. Co., supra note 18, at 768; cf. 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 222A (1965); De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 412 
(2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1945): "But 'torts' is a broad field of law; 
and while the doctrine [of fault] may apply to negligence, it does not apply to con• 
version or appropriation." 
20. 17 U.S.C. § l(c) (1964) (protecting the delivery of a nondramatic literary 
work). 
21. 17 U.S.C. § IOI(b) (1964). 
22. 17 u.s.c. § 21 (1964). 
23. See 1 Stat. 124 (1790); 16 Stat. 214 (1870). 
24. See DRONE, PROPERTY 401-03 (1879). 
25. See Hearings on H.R. 19853 and S. 6330 Before the Committees on Patents of 
the Senate and House of Representatives, Conjointly, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1906). 
26. In several cases decided prior to the adoption of the present Copyright Act, 
employers were deemed to be liable for the infringing acts of their employees only 
if they could be charged with knowledge of the infringement. See Trow Directory, 
Printipg & Bookbinding Co. v. Boyd, 97 Fed. 586 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1899); West Publishing 
Co. v. Lawyers' Co-op. Publishing Co., 79 Fed. 756 (2d Cir. 1897). A principal may not 
be subjected to penalties and forfeitures, designed in part as punishment for an offense, 
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drafting of the 1909 act.27 Since that time, however, courts have been 
influenced by the same policy considerations that have encouraged 
them generally to ignore the innocence of infringers,28 and they 
have employed vicarious liability to broaden further the area of 
accountability for infringement. 
The first parties to be held vicariously liable under the Copy-
right Act were owners of night clubs, dance halls, and amusement 
theatres in which there were unauthorized performances of copy-
righted songs.29 It was apparent that the protection accorded literary 
property would be diminished if these proprietors could insulate 
themselves from liability for damages by merely avoiding inquiry 
into the nature of the performance at their establishments, since the 
only recourse left to the copyright owner would be against the per-
former.30 The courts also felt that the owners of the establishments 
could spread the burden of the risk of infringement by either obtain-
. ing liability insurance or seeking indemnity from the performers.81 
To hold these owners of entertainment establishments liable, the 
courts relied on common-law agency theory. The performers were 
held to be either servants acting within the scope of their authority82 
or agents implicitly authorized by the establishment proprietors to 
engage in the performance which constituted the infringement.88 
, 
by an unauthorized copyright infringement of his agent. See McDonald v. Hearst, 
95 Fed. 656 (N.D. Cal. 1899). 
27. For a history of strict and vicarious liability in copyright legislation, sec 
!.ATMAN & TAGER, LIABILITY OF INNOCENT lNFRINGERS OF COPYRIGHTS (U.S. Copyright 
Office General Revision of the Copyright Law Study No. 8, 1958). 
28. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir, 
1963): "For much the same reasons, the imposition of vicarious liability in the case 
before us cannot be deemed unduly harsh or unfair." See also M. Witmark & Sons v, 
Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787 (D. Mass. 1960); Buck v. Pettijohn, 
34 F. Supp. 968 (E.D. Tenn. 1940). 
29. E.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412 (E.D. Tenn, 1927); M. Wit-
mark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E.D.S.C. 1924); Harms v. Cohen, 
279 Fed. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1922). 
30. For discussion of the policy of imposing vicarious liability in these cases, sec 
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 {2d Cir. 1963); De Acosta v. 
Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 412 {2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1945). • 
31. See M. Witmark & Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. '187 
(D. Mass. 1960); Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co., 58 F. Supp. 523 {D, Neb. 
1944), afj'd, 157 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1946). Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 
260 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952 (1958), holding a department store owner 
liable for an infringement by its concessionaire, had the following effect: "A flock of 
retailers and chain stores . . • notified disk companies that they [would] • . • not 
handle any disks from any company without indemnification or other guarantees that 
they [would) ... not be responsible for disks •.• not licensed by publishers." Variety, 
Oct. 16, 1957, p. 63, col. I. 
32. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. La. 1942); M. Wit• 
mark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412 (E.D. Tenn. 1927). 
33. M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E.D.S.C, 1924); 
Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1922). For a discussion of the applicability of 
the rule of respondeat superior in these cases and the cases cited in note 32 supra, 
see SEAVEY, AGENCY §§ 91-93 (1964). 
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Most of the holdings were difficult to justify, since the performer 
usually appeared to be an independent contractor with an absolute 
right to choose his own material. Consequently, still convinced that 
it was desirable to hold the proprietors liable, judges abandoned 
the agency theory for the more flexible "right to control coupled 
with a .financial interest" test for imposing vicarious liability for 
infringement.34 Under this test, a department store with a .financial 
interest in the sale by its concessionaire of infringing phonograph 
records has been held liable.35 However, a landlord with no .financial 
interest in the infringing activities of his tenant, 86 and a radio adver-
tiser with a .financial interest in, but no right to control, the selection 
of records on its program, 87 have been. exonerated for the infringe-
ments to which they did not contribute. 
It is questionable whether this test for vicarious liability effec-
tuates any congressional intention found in or inferable from the 
Copyright Act. It is true that the requirement of ".financial interest" 
has some statutory relevance in cases involving infringements of 
musical compositions or non-dramatic literary productions. The 
Copyright Act gives holders of copyrights on these works the exclu-
sive right to perform them "in public for profit";38 thus, profit is a 
necessary requisite for an infringement of the protected right.89 
Testing a party's financial interest in an infringement seems tanta-
mount to judging whether he is seeking a profit, yet the ".financial 
interest" test inquires into the profit sought by the particular party 
charged with vicarious liability. In this respect, it differs substan-
tially from the "for profit" test set by the Copyright Act, which 
has been held not to require that the profit sought by individual 
infringers be shown.4° Furthermore, Congress has developed a dif-
ferent rule to protect dramatic works, such as that of the petitioner 
in the principal case. These works are protected against any unau-
thorized public performance, regardless of whether profit is sought.41 
Thus, ".financial interest" has no relation to the provisions of the 
34. Apparently the first case to employ these criteria was Irving :Berlin, Inc. v. 
Daigle, 26 F.2d 149 (E.D. La. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 31 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 
1929). See also Shapiro, :Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 
1963); Dreamland :Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, :Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 
1929); M. Witmark & Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787 
(D. Mass. 1960); :Buck v. Pettijohn, 34 F. Supp. 968 (E.D. Tenn. 1940). 
35. Shapiro, :Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., supra note 34. 
36. Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1938). 
37. National Ass'n of Performing Artists v. Wm. Penn :Broadcasting Co., 38 F. 
Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1941). 
38. 17 U.S.C. §§ l(c), (e) (1964). 
39. See Famous Music Corp. v. Melz, 28 F. Supp. 767 (W .D. L-a. 1939); M. Witmark 
&: Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E.D.S.C. 1924). 
40. See Associated Music. Publishers, Inc. v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc., 141 
F.2d 852 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 766 (1944); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold 
Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947). 
41. 17 U.S.C. § l(d) (1964). 
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Copyright Act in cases involving dramatic works. This distinction 
betv,een the protection given dramatic performances and that given 
other types of performances has been the subject of extensive con-
gressional debate,42 but it is apparent from the present wording of 
the statute that Congress intends the distinction to be maintained. 
The "right to control" also bears no apparent relation to the 
terms of the Copyright Act. This requirement is usually applied to 
justify vicarious liability in agency cases,43 but it has been applied 
in copyright infringement situations, such as the principal case, 
where it is clear that no form of agency exists between _ the actual 
infringers and the parties held vicariously liable.44 The courts have 
made no attempt to support these holdings by reference either to 
the Copyright Act or to congressional intent. Consequently, the 
justification for the "right to control coupled with a financial inter-
est" test in copyright litigation remains unclear. 
II. APPLICATION OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY TO TELEVISION SPONSORS 
Not only is it difficult to support the imposition of vicarious 
liability in the principal case by the provisions of the Copyright 
Act; there would also appear to be little policy basis for imposing 
such liability on television sponsors. Most television programs today 
are controlled by their producers under the supervision of the net-
works.45 A sponsor's only contact witp, the program is usually through 
an advertising agency, and he ordinarily has little opportunity to 
"police" the production;46 nevertheless, the principal case indicates 
42. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1909). See generally 
VARMER, LIMITATIONS ON PERFORMING RIGHTS (U.S. Copyright Office General Revision 
of the Copyright Law Study No. 16, 1958). 
43. "Right to control" is an essential element of a master-servant relationship. 
MECHEM, AGENCY § 13 (4th ed. 1952); SEAVEY, AGENCY § 6 (1964). 
44. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 
1963), in which a chain store owner was held liable for infringement by a phonograph 
record concessionaire who had licensed an area in the store in which to play its 
records. In reversing a district court holding that the owner was not liable, the court 
noted: "Realistically, the courts have not drawn a rigid line between the strict cases 
of agency, and those of independent contract, license, and lease." Id. at 307. Sec also 
cases cited supra note 34. The courts in all of these cases held that proprietors coµld 
not escape infringement liability on the ground that the performer was an indc• 
pendent contractor. 
45. Of course, there are some instances where the sponsor owns and produces his 
own show. See Kennedy, Programming Content and Quality, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD, 
541 (1957). However, at the present time producers are usually engaged by the net• 
works, which in tum have extensive control over the programs. See SENATE COM• 
MnTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 84TH CONG., 2o SESS,, THE NETWORK 
MONOPOLY (Comm. Print 1956) (prepared by Senator Bricker); Sponsor, May 17, 1965, 
p. 42 (networks now control 93.1% of "prime, time" on television); id., Nov. 16, 1964, 
p. 12 (too much network control over programming). 
46. In the principal case, DuPont's only apparent contacts with the show occurred 
when it received a copy of the script, and when the advertising agents attended story 
conferences. Principal case at 631-32. 
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for the first time that a sponsor may be held liable for a television 
program's copyright infringement.47 Since even co-sponsors·and time 
buyers48 have some rights of control, 49 as well as a financial interest 
in the popularity of the program, it is possible that they too could 
be held liable under the test utilized in the principal case. 50 Spon-
sors and time buyers can of course protect themselves from such 
liability either by purchasing liability insurance or by constantly 
supervising the program content. Increased outside supervision of 
program content, however, would be a hindrance to production.51 
Furthermore, the duty to supervise and insure would be especially 
burdensome to time buyers, who constitute a large segment of tele-
vision's advertising market and who typically operate on a small 
advertising budget. · 
It would appear most equitable to place the entire risk of copy-
right infringement on the networks and producers rat4er than on 
the sponsors. Networks and producers are clearly liable under the 
Copyright Act as direct participants in infringements on their pro-
grams. 52 Since they exercise extensive control over programming, 
the networks can continue to police the content of the shows with-
47. A sponsor has previously been held liable when it engaged the infringing 
performance itself. Select Theatres Corp. v. Ronzoni Macaroni Co., 59 U.S.P.Q. 288 
(S.D.N.Y. 1943). Another sponsor has been held liable when its own radio and tele-
vision advertisement caused an infringement. Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine &: 
Osborn, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal. 1956). However, no prior authority has been 
found holding sponsors vicariously liable for television or radio program content. 
48. "Time buyers" are advertisers who merely buy the rights to a certain amount 
of time on a particular program, during which time they present their advertisement. 
49. Multiple sponsorship clearly dilutes the power of each advertiser, and there 
are "many differences and degrees" in the right of different advertisers to exercise 
control over the actual content of a program. Sponsor, Aug. 3, 1964, p. 27. All have 
the right, however, to protect against activities threatening their interest in the pro-
gram. See SE'ITEL &: GLENN, TELEVISION ADVERTISING AND PRODUCrION HANDBOOK 277-78 
(1953). . , 
50. If the "right to control coupled with a financial interest" test used in the 
principal case is generally adopted, there is no reason why courts could not also make 
sponsors responsible under that test for defamation on the program. Vicarious lia-
bility has been applied in defamation cases, but to date the holdings in such cases have 
rested on common-law agency theory. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. J. C. Penney Co., 30 
Cal. App. 2d 609, 86 P.2d 696 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939); Magidson v. Bloom, 170 Misc. 832, 
11 N.Y.S.2d 324 (N.Y. City Ct. 1939). 
51. Sponsors faced with the threat of liability would be likely to seek indemnity 
from the advertising agencies, thus putting the duty of surveillance of program con• 
tent squarely on the agencies. It would seem more logical to impose the liability on 
advertising agencies, rather than on sponsors, since the agencies have greater contact 
with the production and are under a duty to protect the sponsor's interest. However, 
extensive agency interference with program content has received severe criticism from 
producers, who claim that it prevents efficient production. See Sponsor, July 15, 1963, 
p. 33. 
52. The networks' broadcasting of programs constitutes participation in the infringe-
ment and renders them strictly liable. See Associated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Debs 
Memorial Radio Fund, Inc., 141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1944); Select Theatres Corp. v. 
Ronzoni Macaroni Co., 59 U.S.P.Q. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). Once infringement was found 
in the instant case, the liability of CBS was conceded. 
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out upsetting present practices in the industry. Also, networks can 
acquire protection by securing broad liability coverage, and can 
demand indemnity from their producers. The dearth of litigation 
in the area seems to indicate that the safeguards currently employed 
by the networks and the producers have been generally successful 
in preventing copyright infringement on television programs. There 
is consequently no apparent reason to burden the sponsor with lia-
bility by invoking the questionable "right to control coupled with 
a financial interest" test for vicarious liability under the Copyright 
Act. 
The particular circumstances in the principal case may help to 
explain the decision to impose liability on the sponsor. The court 
noted that DuPont had failed to uphold its "duty to exercise [its] ... 
power so as to insure against copyright infringement"03 after having 
been informed of the potential infringement.54 The court did not 
find this "duty" in the Copyright Act; instead, it seems to have con-
cluded that DuPont's failure to act was essentially a common-law 
tort.55 If this was the actual basis for the decision, however, the 
court should have made this clear rather than invoking a theory of 
vicarious liability to try to bring DuPont within the scope of the 
Copyright Act. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Courts have provided extensive protection for copyrighted works 
by imposing both strict and vicarious liability for copyright infringe-
ment. Strict liability appears consonant with both congressional 
intent and sound policy. Vicarious liability, however, has been ex-
tended beyond cases where actual agency is shown in an attempt to 
impose a duty of surveillance on proprietors in whose establishments 
copyright infringement by performing artists is likely to occur.06 
The "right to control coupled with a financial interest" test conse-
quently adopted by many courts bears little relation to the Copyright 
Act, and lacks a sound policy basis when applied to television spon-
sors. The difficulties created by imposing vicarious liability upon 
sponsors, and the apparent preferability of imposing the entire lia-
bility for infringement upon producers and networks, indicate that 
the holding in the principal case should be reexamined. 
53. Principal case at 632. 
54. Id. at 631-32. 
55. It is not clear from the opinion whether the court considered the breach of 
duty intentional or negligent. 
56. See text accompanying notes 29-37 supra. 
